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Abstract
The Keystroke Biometrics Ongoing Competition (KBOC) presented an anomaly
detection challenge with a public keystroke dataset containing a large number of
subjects and real-world aspects. Over 300 subjects typed case-insensitive repe-
titions of their first and last name, and as a result, keystroke sequences could
vary in length and order depending on the usage of modifier keys. To deal with
this, a keystroke alignment preprocessing algorithm was developed to estab-
lish a semantic correspondence between keystrokes in mismatched sequences.
The method is robust in the sense that query keystroke sequences need only
approximately match a target sequence, and alignment is agnostic to the par-
ticular anomaly detector used. This paper describes the fifteen best-performing
anomaly detection systems submitted to the KBOC, which ranged from auto-
encoding neural networks to ensemble methods. Manhattan distance achieved
the lowest equal error rate of 5.32%, while all fifteen systems performed better
than any other submission. Performance gains are shown to be due in large
part not to the particular anomaly detector, but to preprocessing and score
normalization techniques.
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1. Introduction
The Keystroke Biometrics Ongoing Competition (KBOC) presented an anomaly
detection challenge in the form of a biometric competition [28, 29]. Given only
several template samples for training, participants were tasked with designing
keystroke biometric verification systems that achieved a low equal error rate on
a set of unlabeled query samples. Unlike previous keystroke biometric competi-
tions [23], the KBOC utilized a platform that allows ongoing participation [26].
This paper describes the best-performing systems of the KBOC. These systems
addressed two unique features of the KBOC dataset not typically seen in other
keystroke datasets.
The keystrokes closely match, but are not necessary identical to, a target se-
quence. Genuine and impostor subjects were required to type a case insensitive
match to the template subject’s first and last name. As a result, the samples
contain insertions, deletions, substitutions, and transpositions from each other,
primarily due to the usage of modifier keys. Even the template keystroke se-
quences sometimes differ from one another, reflecting inconsistencies in the way
a genuine subject types their name. Thus, the template and query samples
only approximately match a target keystroke sequence. This scenario is not
quite fixed-text, such as password entry, and not quite free-text, such as an
essay response. To deal with the mismatched samples, a keystroke alignment
preprocessing algorithm robust to typing errors was developed. The method
maximizes the amount of data available for training and testing, achieving bet-
ter performance over benchmark alternatives, such as discarding mismatched
keystrokes or truncating sequences to the length of the shortest sequence.
The target keystroke sequence is unique to each subject. Unlike most fixed-
text datasets in which every subject types the same password or passphrase (e.g.,
[15] and other datasets described in Giot et al. [10]), the target input string1
1string refers to the character sequence that actually appears on screen, and keystroke
sequence refers to the sequence of keys pressed. For example, both keystroke sequences “G,
Backspace, T” and “T” result in string “t”. Keyboard key names are denoted in monospace.
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for each subject in the KBOC dataset was the subject’s first and last name.
Thus, the keystroke sequences for each subject are different. Importantly, the
samples reflect a keystroke sequence that the genuine subject is more familiar
with than an impostor. Since the keystroke sequences are different for each
subject, two-class models (i.e., genuine vs. impostor) are not practical due to
the difficulty in utilizing negative data for training. Therefore, only one-class
models, i.e, anomaly detectors, are considered. Given only several template
samples are available for training, the anomaly detector must be able to learn
a given subject’s pattern quickly. To this end, feature and score normalization
techniques robust to outliers and few training samples were developed.
The keystroke alignment and score normalization techniques described in
this work are agnostic to the particular anomaly detector used, and results are
obtained for a range of models. The complete anomaly detection systems uti-
lize a processing pipeline that consists of four main steps: keystroke alignment,
feature extraction, scoring, and score normalization. During keystroke align-
ment, a correspondence is established between keystrokes of the query and tem-
plate samples, which may differ slightly as described below. The query sample
keystrokes are aligned to match the template, which enables standard fixed-text
techniques to subsequently be applied. Keystroke timing features are extracted
from the aligned sequences using normalization bounds specific to each subject.
Following this, an anomaly detector is trained on the template samples and a
similarity score is assigned to the query sample. Finally, the score is normalized
using subject-specific normalization bounds.
Performance gains are largely due to the score normalization and keystroke
alignment techniques, over alternative methods, as demonstrated in the results
of this work. The feature and score normalization techniques use subject-specific
bounds which are robust against feature and score outliers, respectively. The
keystroke alignment method is robust to typing errors and slightly differing
keystroke sequences. This maximizes the amount of data available for training
and testing, leading to a reduced failure to capture (FTC) rate [3]. The fif-
teen best-performing systems in the KBOC ranged from auto-encoding neural
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networks to Manhattan distance, and all fifteen systems achieved a lower equal
error rate than any other submission.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a back-
ground of the KBOC data collection procedure and competition details. Sections
3 and 4 describe keystroke alignment and feature extraction, respectively. Sec-
tion 5 describes the various anomaly detectors, followed by score normalization
in Section 6. Experimental results are contained in Section 7, and Section 8 dis-
cusses and analyzes the effects of keystroke alignment and score normalization.
Finally, Section 9 draws conclusions and discusses future work. Source code of
all the systems described and to reproduce the results in this paper is available
at https://github.com/vmonaco/kboc.
2. Background
The KBOC was part of the IEEE Eighth International Conference on Bio-
metrics: Theory, Applications, and Systems (BTAS 2016) and had two modes
of participation: online mode and offline mode. Participation in the online mode
is continuous, hence the “ongoing” competition2 [28, 29]. This paper describes
only the offline mode, which ran from January 31, 2016 (when the test dataset
became available), to April 22, 2016 (the deadline for submissions). Each partic-
ipant could submit up to 15 systems, and submissions were evaluated only after
the competition deadline to avoid overfitting. The KBOC dataset, described in
this section, is publicly available upon request3.
2.1. Dataset
Two separate datasets were made available to competition participants: a
development set for the purpose of system development, and a test set for the
purpose of system evaluation. The development set contains 10 subjects, each
2Current leaderboard https://www.beat-eu.org/platform/search/aythamimm/KBOC16_
COMPETITION_SEARCH/
3See https://sites.google.com/site/btas16kboc/home
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with 24 labeled samples (14 genuine and 10 impostor). The test set contains 300
subjects, each with 4 labeled template samples and 20 unlabeled query samples.
The ratio of genuine to impostor samples in the test set remained hidden from
competition participants to increase difficulty.
Data collection was performed in a semi-controlled environment designed
for multimodal recordings [9]. Subjects were geographically dispersed across 6
collection sites and approximately evenly distributed by age (42% 18–25, 22%
25–35, 16% 35–45, 20% >45) and gender (54% male). Each subject participated
in 4 data collection sessions within 4 months time. During each session, the
subject typed 4 case-insensitive repetitions of their own name (2 in the middle
of the session and 2 at the end) and the names of 3 other subjects (7 samples
total). While there were totally 16 genuine and 12 impostor samples available
for each subject in the original dataset [9], the numbers of genuine and impostor
samples were randomly selected for the KBOC test dataset. This ranged from
8 to 12, leaving 4 template samples per subject. Samples that contained typing
errors during data collection were discarded. However, the number of keystrokes
per subject could vary due to the use of modifier keys, such as Shift and Caps
Lock. This is an important characteristic motivating the development of a
keystroke alignment preprocessing algorithm in Section 3.
Each raw sample contains a sequence of 3-tuple events comprised of the
action (press or release), keyboard scancode, and the time interval since the
previous event (beginning with 0 for the first event). In this work, the action
sequence is converted to a keystroke sequence, wherein each keystroke event is
a 3-tuple that contains the key name, press timestamp, and release timestamp.
Samples range in length based on the subject’s name, from 12 to 30 keystrokes
with an average of 25.5± 4.4 keystrokes. Timing features, described in Section
4, are extracted from the aligned keystroke sequence.
Timestamps were recorded with 1 millisecond (ms) resolution, although the
actual resolution is limited by scheduling policies of the operating system kernel.
Specifically, most operating system kernels handle interrupts from peripheral
devices on a fixed period set by a global timer. Timestamp resolution is then
5
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(a) KBOC keystroke timings with estimated 46.4 ms resolution.
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(b) Monaco et al. [21] keystroke timings with estimated 15.6 ms resolution.
Figure 1: Resolution of the KBOC keystroke timings compared to another
dataset. Resolution is estimated by taking the difference between modes of
a Gaussian KDE applied to the empirical press-press latency distribution.
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limited by how quickly the kernel can respond to an interrupt generated by the
keyboard device, which is at most the global timer period. This effect is evident
in the empirical distribution of press-press latencies, shown in Figure 1a. A
Gaussian kernel density estimate (KDE) is applied to the latencies to identify
regions of relatively high density, i.e., clustered latencies. The high density re-
gions reflect quantization introduced by the global timer, and dispersion within
each region reflects timestamp precision4. Taking the mean distance between
modes of the Gaussian KDE gives an estimated precision of 46.4 ms, close to
the 40 ms estimated precision in Morales et al. [29]. For comparison, the same
technique is applied to the press-press latencies of a free-text keystroke dataset
collected on a different platform: a Java application running on Windows desk-
top computers [21]. The resolution of the free-text dataset, shown in Figure 1b,
is estimated to be 15.6 ms, which agrees very well with the 15.6 ms Windows
default system-wide timer [19]. According to results in Killourhy and Maxion
[13], the relatively lower resolution of the KBOC timings makes anomaly de-
tection more challenging, as higher equal error rates have been associated with
lower resolution timestamps. Besides the global timer period, system load and
other environmental factors also play a role in determining the resolution and
precision of keystroke event timestamps [14].
2.2. System evaluation
Anomaly detectors are often evaluated by their equal error rate (EER), the
point on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve at which the false
acceptance rate (FAR) is equal to the false rejection rate (FRR). The EER can
be derived by varying either a global threshold or subject-dependent thresholds.
To compute the global EER, the ROC curve is derived by varying a global
threshold. In this case, the proportions of false positive and false negative
classifications from all subjects are counted to compute the FAR and FRR at
4Note that resolution is the degree to which a measurement can be made and precision is
the degree to which a measurement can be repeated.
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each threshold value.
The subject EER is the EER obtained by deriving an ROC curve for each
subject. As a subject-dependent threshold is varied, the FAR and FRR are com-
puted using the number of false positive and false negative classifications for a
single subject. Since this produces an EER for each subject in the dataset, sys-
tem performance is typically characterized by the mean and standard deviation
(SD) of the distribution of subject EERs.
The KBOC anomaly detectors are evaluated by the global EER. There are
20 query samples for each subject in the KBOC test dataset, which provides
300×20 = 6000 scores to derive the global ROC curve. In the rest of this paper,
EER refers to the global EER unless otherwise noted.
3. Keystroke alignment
3.1. Motivation
The KBOC data collection procedure required samples to be a case-insensitive
match to the subject’s first and last name. As a result, the presence of modifier
keys (e.g., Shift and Caps Lock) produced different keystroke sequences for the
same case-insensitive string typed. Samples could vary in length (i.e., number
of keystrokes) depending on whether modifier keys were used for capitalization.
They could also vary in sequence depending on the order of keys pressed. In
particular, both template and query samples contain:
• Insertions and deletions, e.g., due to the use or disuse of Shift.
• Substitutions, e.g., due to the use of Caps Lock instead of Shift5.
• Transpositions, e.g., both sequences “Space, Shift, T” and “Shift, Space,
T” result in the string “T” when the Shift key is prolonged.
5There are also some substitutions due to different keyboard scancode sets being used [4].
In set 1, Keypad-minus is 35 (hex), and in set 2 Keypad-minus is 4a (hex).
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This scenario is not quite fixed text, such as password entry which requires an
exact match, and not quite free text, such as answering an open-ended question
which places no restriction on the text entered. Instead, the keystroke sequence
closely matches some target sequence for each subject.
The need for a keystroke alignment method is verified by comparing the
keystroke sequences, and not the typed string. Consider all possible combina-
tions of template samples for each subject, i.e,
(
4
2
)× 300 = 1800 combinations.
Of these, 226 out of 1800 (12.6%) template-to-template comparisons differ from
each other. The average Damerau-Levenshtein (DL) distance, which measures
insertions, deletions, substitutions, and transpositions [6], is 0.053± 0.276 with
a maximum distance of 4. Similarly, there are 20 × 4 × 300 = 24, 000 possible
query-to-template combinations in which a query sample is compared to a single
template sample. Of these, 1545 out of 24,000 (6.4%) query-to-template com-
parisons differ from each other, with an average DL distance of 0.074 ± 0.323
and maximum distance of 7.
Many anomaly detectors operate on fixed-length feature vectors, motivat-
ing the development of a method to compare slightly differing sequences. One
option is to use a free-text approach in which fixed-length feature vectors are
extracted from arbitrary keystroke sequences using a fallback hierarchy of de-
scriptive statistics [21]. In this case, the fact that the sequences are very close
to some target sequence is ignored. Instead, it would be desirable to create
fixed-length keystroke sequences from the semi-constrained sequences and then
apply standard feature extraction techniques [15]. The method introduced in
this work aims to align the keystrokes from two slightly differing sequences and
then extract standard time interval features from the aligned sequences.
3.2. Alignment method
To compare slightly-differing keystroke sequences, a sequence-alignment al-
gorithm was developed to establish a correspondence between keystrokes of two
different samples. This allows two samples with similar keystroke sequences to
be compared using an anomaly detector that operates on feature vectors of fixed
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length, such as Manhattan distance. In establishing the correspondence, let the
target sequence be a fixed sequence of keystrokes to which a given sequence will
be aligned. Thus, the given sequence is modified to match the target.
Keystrokes from the given sequence are aligned to the target sequence as
follows. For each key in the target sequence, find the same key in the given se-
quence with the closest position. If the key does not exist in the given sequence,
then use as a substitute the key in the corresponding position. If a key appears
in the given sequence, but not the target sequence, it is simply ignored. The
keystrokes in the given sequence are then reordered by their mapping to the
target sequence, as shown in Figure 2a.
Since there exist both within-template and query-to-template differences in
the keystroke sequences, as demonstrated in Section 3.1, a two-step alignment
process is employed. First, let the target sequence for each subject be the
template sample with fewest keystrokes. The remaining 3 template samples for
each subject are aligned to the target sequence. This creates a set of aligned
template samples from which the anomaly detector is trained. Next, the query
samples for each subject are aligned to the target sequence. The aligned query
samples are then scored by the fixed-text anomaly detector.
Alignment ensures an element-wise semantic similarity between the given
and target keystrokes, and subsequently, the extracted features. In other words,
considering the keystrokes of a target sequence, the corresponding keystrokes in
the given sequence should have been pressed with similar intention by the sub-
ject. Keystroke alignment ensures this correspondence by matching substituted
and transposed keys between the two sequences.
To illustrate its utility, keystroke alignment is compared to some benchmark
alternatives, also shown in Figure 2. Let truncate be the method in which the
keystrokes of the given sequence are simply truncated to be the same length as
the target sequence. This approach is shown in Figure 2b. Unless the keystroke
sequences match exactly, semantically different features will be compared by
the anomaly detector, following feature extraction. Truncation is especially
sensitive to sequences that differ in length, as shown in the example.
10
  
Target
Given
F I R S T Space Shift L A S TShift
F I R S T Shift Space L A S T
(a) Alignment.
  
Target
Given
F I R S T Space Shift L A S TShift
F I R S T Shift Space L A S T
(b) Truncate.
  
Target
Given
F I R S T Space Shift L A S TShift
F I R S T Shift Space L A S T
(c) Discard.
Figure 2: Keystroke alignment vs. two benchmark methods. In this example, the
first Shift is deleted in the given sequence, and “Shift, Space” are transposed.
Keystroke alignment (2a) preserves the maximum amount of data, while ensur-
ing a semantic correspondence between keystrokes. Truncation (2b) ignores key
names, and is sensitive to sequences with differing lengths. Discarding modifier
keys (2c) ensures keystrokes match exactly (assuming case-insensitive equality),
but ignores some of the data.
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Alternatively, consider the method of discarding modifier keys, shown in
Figure 2c. While this method has the advantage that the resulting sequences will
match exactly after discarding modifier keys, it ignores distinguishable behavior
which may have been captured by modifier key usage. For example, if a subject
typically types “Left Shift, L” for a capital “L”, and an impostor types “Right
Shift, L”, the press-press latencies of the impostor will likely be longer than
that of the genuine subject. This is due keys that are far apart generally being
be pressed in quicker succession than keys that are close together as a result of
finger and/or hand reuse [32, 22].
4. Feature extraction
Time interval features are extracted from the aligned keystroke sequence,
wherein each keystroke event contains a press time, release time, and key name.
While a variety of keystroke timings can be computed from the timestamps,
this work uses the press-press latencies and key-hold durations. The press-press
latency is the time interval between two successive key-presses, denoted by p.
The key-hold duration is the time interval from the press to release of each key,
denoted by d. If the target sequence contains 11 keystrokes, then the feature
vectors for every given sequence aligned to the target will contain 31 features
(10 latencies and 11 durations). Note that any other time interval, such as
release-press or release-release latencies of successive keystrokes, can be formed
by a linear combination of the press-press latency and key-hold duration.
The press-press latency is typically positive since keystrokes are normally
ordered by their press time (as they would appear on screen to the user). After
a given sequence has been aligned to a target sequence, the press-press latency
can be negative when there is a transposition between the given and target
sequence. Using Figure 3 as an example, the keystrokes in the given sequence
are reordered to the positions of the corresponding keys in the target sequence.
12
  
Shift
Target
Given
Space Shift L A S T
Space L A S T
Time
p1 p2
p1
p2
p3 p4 p5
p3 p4 p5
0
Key press
Key release
Legend
pi i
th press-press 
latency
Figure 3: Keystroke features.
In the given sequence, the press-press latency from Space to Shift, denoted by
p1, is negative since Shift is pressed before Space.
Reordering the keystrokes of the given sequence in this way, such that the
press-press latency becomes negative for transposed keys, does not have an
adverse effect on anomaly detection as long as this behavior is also captured in
the template samples. Consider a typist who presses the keys Space and Shift
in very quick succession. The press-press latency between these keys will be
close to 0, and if normal behavior is to transpose these keys 50% of the time,
the distribution of press-press latencies will be centered on 0. Then, it does not
matter whether the feature in the given sequence is positive or negative, i.e.,
whether the given sequence contains “Space, Shift” or “Shift, Space”; it has
equal likelihood in both cases.
4.1. Feature normalization
The latency and duration features are normalized to the range [0, 1]. The
ith normalized press-press latency p˙i is given by
p˙i = max
[
0,min
(
1,
pi − bpc
dpe − bpc
)]
(1)
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where pi is the raw feature and bpc and dpe provide the lower and upper bounds
for normalization, respectively. Let µp be the mean and σp the SD of the
distribution of latencies in the subject’s aligned template samples. That is, µp
and σp are determined by the aligned templates no matter whether the feature
being normalized is from a query or template sample. Normalization bounds
are given by
bpc = µp −Hfσp
dpe = µp +Hfσp (2)
where Hf is a free parameter. In this work, results were obtained using Hf = 1,
i.e., normalizing features to within one SD of the mean. The duration features
are normalized similarly, replacing d for p.
Note that feature normalization uses the first and second order statistics
of the distribution of the subject’s aligned template samples. The effect of
this approach is twofold. First, it ensures that outlier features do not greatly
affect the normalization bounds as they would using min/max normalization.
Second, per-subject normalization ensures that normalized features are relative
to the subject’s template since each subject has their own normalization bounds.
Query samples are normalized using the lower and upper bounds determined
from the template samples. Thus, if the query sample is genuine, its normalized
features will be closer to the center of the interval [0, 1], whereas the normalized
features of an impostor sample will be closer to the endpoints (assuming it is
greater or less than the genuine mean).
5. Anomaly detection
The keystroke alignment and feature normalization methods introduced in
this work are agnostic to the particular anomaly detector used. Six different
anomaly detectors, and one ensemble method, are described in this section.
Neural network models were implemented using the TensorFlow library [1]. All
models were implemented in Python and remain publicly available at https:
//github.com/vmonaco/kboc.
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5.1. Autoencoder
The basic autoencoder (AE) is a neural network that aims to encode and
then decode its input [2]. The network topology consists of equally-sized input
and output layers separated by at least one hidden layer. Successive layers are
fully connected through weight matrices, a bias vector, and a nonlinear function.
It is common to use tied weights, i.e., the weight matrix connecting the hidden
and output layers is simply the transpose weight matrix connecting the input
and hidden layers. This limits the number of model parameters and acts as a
kind of regularization.
Using feature vector x as input, the hidden layer is calculated as
h = f (x) = tanh (Wx+ bh) (3)
where W is the weight matrix and bh is the hidden layer bias vector. Similarly,
the output layer y is given by
y = g (x) = tanh
(
W>h+ by
)
(4)
where by is the output bias vector. The complete model parameters consist of
θ = {W, bh, by}. Hidden layers can be stacked to create a deep network, and
dimensions of the hidden layers comprise the model hyperparameters. Typically,
at least one hidden layer should be smaller than the input layer to achieve a
compressed representation and avoid learning the identity function. Parameters
are determined by back-propagating gradients from a squared error loss function,
L (x, y) = ‖x− y‖2 . (5)
where y is the reconstructed output. The objective function of the basic au-
toencoder is given by
JAE (θ) =
∑
x∈D
L (x, g (f (x))) (6)
where D is the set of training examples. Bias parameters are initialized to 0
and weights are initialized from a random uniform distribution such that the
15
scale of the gradients in each layer is roughly the same [11]. During testing, the
score of a query sample is given by the negative reconstruction error, −L (x, y).
5.2. Contractive autoencoder
The contractive autoencoder (CAE) is an autoencoder that uses the Frobe-
nius norm of the hidden layer Jacobian as a regularization term [31]. This en-
ables a sparse representation of the input whereby the dimension of the hidden
layer is much larger than the input and output layer dimensions. The CAE is
closely related to the denoising autoencoder, in which the goal is to reconstruct
an input vector that has been corrupted by noise [34].
The CAE in this work uses a sigmoid activation function. The hidden layer
is given by
h = f (x) = σ (Wx+ bh) (7)
where σ (z) = (1 + e−z)−1. Similarly, the output layer is given by
y = g (x) = σ
(
W>h+ by
)
. (8)
The objective function of the CAE includes a regularization term that penalizes
the Jacobian of f ,
JCAE (θ) =
∑
x∈D
L (x, g (f (x))) + λ‖Jf (x) ‖2F
where λ is a free parameter and ‖ · ‖2F is the squared Frobenius norm. Similar
to the basic autoencoder, the loss function, L, is the squared reconstruction
error. Using a sigmoid activation function allows for efficient computation of
the Jacobian, given by
‖Jf (x) ‖2F =
∑
ij
[
∂hj (x)
∂xi
]2
=
dh∑
i=1
[hi (1− hi)]2
dx∑
j=1
W 2ij (9)
where dh and dx are the hidden and input layer dimensions, respectively. Similar
to the basic AE, bias vectors are initialized to 0 and weight vectors use Xavier
initialization [11].
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5.3. Variational autoencoder
The variational autoencoder (VAE) is a probabilistic autoencoder with con-
tinuous latent variables [17]. Parameters are learned efficiently by backpropa-
gation through a reparametrization trick, which allows the gradient of the loss
function to propagate through the sampling process. The objective function
of the VAE is composed of both a reconstruction loss and a latent loss. Query
sample scores are given by the negative reconstruction loss, which is the negative
log probability of the input given the reconstructed latent distribution.
5.4. One-class support vector machine
The one-class support vector machine (SVM) is an unsupervised model that
learns a separating hyperplane between the origin and feature vector points6
[33]. The free parameters of the model include η, the fraction of training errors
(samples that lie outside the separating plane), in addition to any parameters of
the kernel function. This work uses the one-class SVM implemented by scikit-
learn [30], which internally uses libsvm [5]. Query sample scores are given by
the negative distance to the separating hyperplane.
5.5. Manhattan distance
Manhattan distance between two vectors x and y is computed by
D (x, y) =
dx∑
i
|xi − yi| (10)
where dx is the dimension of the feature vectors. Query sample scores are given
by the negative Manhattan distance to the mean template vector. Thus, training
is comprised simply of computing the element-wise mean of the template vectors.
Scaled Manhattan distance was previously shown to achieve state-of-the-art
accuracy in keystroke biometric anomaly detection [15], and Manhattan distance
closely followed. Scaled Manhattan distance was not used in this work since the
6Alternatively, one may learn a minimal-volume hypersphere that encapsulates most of the
points in feature space.
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number of template samples (4) is not large enough to obtain a reliable estimate
of the absolute (or standard) deviation of each feature.
5.6. Partially observable hidden Markov model
The partially observable hidden Markov model (POHMM) is an extension of
the hidden Markov model in which hidden states are conditioned on an indepen-
dent Markov chain [24, 20]. In a two-state model of typing behavior, the subject
can be in an active state, during which relatively short time intervals are ob-
served, or passive state, during which relatively long time intervals are observed.
The keyboard key names form an independent Markov chain upon which the
hidden states are conditioned. The key name partially reveals the hidden state
since certain keys, such as Space or Shift, indicate a greater probably of being
in a passive state, i.e., of observing longer time intervals, than letter keys, such
as H and E. Despite an explosion in the number of model parameters, parameter
estimation can still be performed in linear time using a modified Baum-Welch
algorithm. A parameter smoothing technique is employed to avoid overfitting
the model to short input sequences [20].
Keystroke timing features are modeled by a lognormal distribution, and pa-
rameters are initialized based on a one-state model. The POHMM is a free-text
model, since it operates on arbitrary keystroke sequences and does not require
fixed-length input. Therefore, the POHMM does not use the keystroke align-
ment or feature extraction algorithms described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
Query sample scores are given by the model loglikelihood.
5.7. Ensemble
An ensemble of anomaly detectors was formed with the goal of achieving
higher accuracy than any individual member. The ensemble score is simply
the mean unnormalized score from each system in the ensemble. The sum rule
(which is equivalent to a scaled mean) has been shown to be a robust, albeit
simple, method of combining classifier output scores, especially when the scores
between the systems being combined are independent [18].
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6. Score normalization
Per-subject score normalization is employed whereby normalization bounds
are determined by the test scores for each subject. Let su be the set of scores
from subject u and sui be the ith score from subject u. The normalized score,
s˙ui, is given by
s˙ui = max
[
0,min
(
1,
sui − bsuc
dsue − bsuc
)]
(11)
where bsuc and dsue are the lower and upper bounds used for normalization.
Note that the clamping function max [0,min (1, ·)] ensures the resulting score is
in the range [0, 1]. Two methods of score normalization are compared, which
differ in the way bsuc and dsue are defined.
6.1. SD normalization
In SD normalization, the scores are normalized using the SD of the scores
within each subject. Let µsu be the mean score for subject u and σsu be the SD
score for subject u. The lower and upper bounds for normalization are given by
bsuc = µsu −Hsσsu
dsue = µsu +Hsσsu (12)
where Hs is a free parameter. In this work, Hs = 2 normalizes scores to within
2 SD of the mean.
6.2. Min/max normalization
Min/max normalization is achieved by letting
bsuc = min su
dsue = max su (13)
where min su and max su denote the minimum and maximum scores from sub-
ject u, respectively.
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7. Results
Hyperparameters, such as hidden layer sizes in the AE models and conver-
gence criteria, were selected from a small range that performed well on the
KBOC development set. A validation EER was determined for each system
through a Monte Carlo validation procedure using the development dataset. In
each repetition, 4 template samples were randomly selected from the genuine
samples. The remaining 20 samples (10 genuine and 10 impostor) were used as
the query samples. These conditions mimic the test dataset, in which there are
4 labeled template samples and 20 unlabeled query samples for each subject.
This process was repeated 10 times to obtain a confidence interval on the EER.
System descriptions, including hyper-parameters, are as follows:
System 1: AE with hidden layers of dimensions {5, 4, 3}. Models were trained
for 5000 epochs using gradient descent with a learning rate of 0.5.
System 2: VAE with hidden layers of dimensions {5, 5}, 3-dimensional Gaus-
sian latent space, and softplus nonlinearities between layers. Parameters
were learned by Adam, a stochastic gradient-based optimization algorithm
[16], using a learning rate of 0.001, mini-batch size of 2, and 700 epochs.
Systems 3 and 11: POHMM with two-dimensional log-normal emission (for
the press-press latency and duration) and two hidden states. Convergence
was reached when the reduction in the loglikelihood was less than 0.01.
Systems 4 and 12: one-class SVM with η = 0.5, radial basis function (RBF)
kernel, and RBF kernel parameter γ = 0.9.
Systems 5 and 13: CAE with hidden layer of dimension 400 and regulariza-
tion weight λ = 1.5. Model parameters were learned by gradient descent
with a 0.01 learning rate and 1000 epochs.
System 6: Manhattan distance.
System 7: AE with hidden layer of dimension 5.
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System Description Validation Test
SD score normalization
1 Autoencoder {5,4,3} 7.90 (1.91) 7.82
2 Variational autoencoder 6.50 (0.75) 6.46
3 POHMM 7.75 (1.36) 7.32
4 One-class SVM 7.40 (2.20) 7.35
5 Contractive autoencoder {400} 6.20 (1.27) 8.02
6 Manhattan distance 6.95 (1.17) 5.32
7 Autoencoder {5} 5.75 (1.57) 7.95
8 Contractive autoencoder {200} 6.50 (1.47) 8.08
9 Mean ensemble systems 3,4,5 5.40 (1.45) 5.68
10 Mean ensemble systems 1-8 5.85 (1.31) 5.91
Min/max score normalization
11 POHMM 8.75 (1.38) 10.35
12 One-class SVM 12.10 (1.63) 10.89
13 Contractive autoencoder {400} 7.85 (1.23) 11.20
14 Contractive autoencoder {200} 8.00 (1.25) 11.23
15 Mean ensemble systems 11-14 5.75 (1.30) 6.26
Table 1: Summary of validation and test EER (%). The validation EER was
obtained by Monte Carlo procedure that mimics test set conditions (SD shown
in parentheses). The test EER was determined by the KBOC organizers using
score submission files. Hidden layer sizes of neural network models are shown
in braces.
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Systems 8 and 14: CAE with hidden layer of dimension 200 and regulariza-
tion weight λ = 0.5.
System 9: Ensemble mean score of systems 3, 4, and 5, which have low score
correlations. The correlation between scores of systems 3 and 4 is 0.665,
the lowest of any pair that utilized SD score normalization.
System 10: Ensemble mean score of systems 1-8, which all use SD score nor-
malization.
System 15: Ensemble mean score of systems 11-14, which use min/max score
normalization.
Additionally, systems 1-10 used SD score normalization, and systems 11-15 used
min/max score normalization.
The resulting validation and test EERs of the fifteen systems submitted to
the KBOC are shown in Table 1. The test EERs were determined by the KBOC
organizers, as the ground truth labels of the query samples remained hidden
from competition participants. Systems 1-10, which used SD score normaliza-
tion, generally obtained lower EERs than systems 11-15, which used min/max
score normalization. Systems 9 and 15, both ensembles, achieved a lower EER
on the test set than any individual member in the ensemble. This is not the
case for system 10, which is an ensemble of systems 1-8. Systems 5, 7, and 8
show a significant decrease in performance from the validation EER, suggesting
overfitting to the development set due to the chosen hyperparameters.
8. Discussion
8.1. Effects of keystroke alignment
Bours and Komanpally [3] outlined three different scenarios that can occur
as a result of typing fixed text, such as password entry:
1. The string that was typed does not match the target string.
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2. The string that was typed matches the target string, but contains correc-
tions due to typing errors.
3. The string that was typed matches the target string without making cor-
rections. This is the most commonly assumed scenario in keystroke bio-
metrics, such that the query keystroke sequences exactly match the tem-
plate sequence.
Bours and Komanpally [3] considered scenario 2, in which sequences could con-
tain extra keystrokes, such as Backspace, due to typing errors. They concluded
that system performance generally increased as a result of lower FTC and more
data being available. However, their work did not utilize keystrokes outside of
the target sequence (.tie5Roanl), as the data was simulated from the fixed-text
dataset in Killourhy and Maxion [15] which assumed scenario 3. The KBOC
dataset instead reflects scenario 1, in which the string that was typed approxi-
mately matches the target string.
In order to further reduce the FTC rate from scenario 2, typed strings that
closely match, but slightly differ from, the target string may be retained (sce-
nario 1). The KBOC dataset reflects this, as only case-insensitive matches to
the target string were required. This resulted in differing keystroke sequences,
and to handle these differences, a keystroke alignment technique was developed.
To determine the effect of keystroke alignment, the method proposed in this
work is compared to the benchmark alternatives described in Section 3.2:
Discard: Discard modifier keys, comparing only character keys.
Truncate: Truncate sequences to the length of the shortest sample.
Table 2 shows the effects of keystroke alignment using a Manhattan distance
detector and SD score normalization. The best performance is achieved using
the keystroke alignment method. Discarding modifier keys obtains the worst
performance, suggesting that the use of modifier keys plays an important role
in keystroke biometrics. Truncating sequences to be of equal length results in
a slightly higher EER than keystroke alignment. Truncation causes different
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Discard Truncate Align
Validation 10.05 (1.44) 6.95 (1.17) 6.95 (1.17)
Test 9.18 7.33 6.53
Table 2: EER (%, SD in parentheses) obtained using different keystroke
alignment methods with a Manhattan detector and SD score normaliza-
tion. Discard=discard modifier keys, Truncate=truncate the template and
query keystroke sequences to the shortest template, Align=keystroke alignment
method described in Section 3.
features to be compared to each other for sequences of differing length. For
example, if the template begins with Shift, and the query begins with T, the
Shift duration feature will correspond to the T duration feature. This has an
adverse effect if the query sample is genuine. However, if the query sample is an
impostor, the mismatched features may generally have greater distances than
the aligned features, improving overall performance. Note that the validation
EERs of the truncation and alignment methods are equal since the length of
the samples in the development set did not differ within any of the 10 subjects.
8.2. Effects of score normalization
To determine the effects of score normalization, the EER is determined using
each normalization method with a Manhattan detector and keystroke alignment.
Table 3 contains the results, and Figure 4 shows the resulting score distributions.
The unnormalized scores perform significantly worse than either min/max or
SD normalization, while SD normalization achieves the best performance. The
unnormalized scores of the test set appear to have a unimodal distribution. The
min/max normalized scores appear bimodal at 0 and 1 due to the presence of
0 and 1 scores for each subject. This effect is not present in the SD normalized
scores, which appear to have a trimodal distribution with peaks at 0 and above
the (presumably) expected genuine and impostor scores. Score normalization
can have a significant effect on system performance and remains an ongoing
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None Min/max SD
Validation 18.40 (1.90) 7.55 (0.96) 6.95 (1.17)
Test 21.20 10.43 6.53
Table 3: EER (%, SD in parentheses) obtained using different score normaliza-
tion methods with a Manhattan detector and keystroke alignment.
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Figure 4: The effects of score normalization using a Manhattan distance
anomaly detector: unnormalized (left), min/max normalization (middle), SD
normalization (right). Min/max normalization is sensitive to outliers; SD nor-
malization is not.
area of research [27]. System performance, as measured by either the global or
subject EER, is affected by score normalization in three different ways.
First, score normalization places the scores from multiple anomaly detectors
on the same scale for the purpose of score-level classifier fusion [12]. Members
of an ensemble may correspond to different models for a single modality or to
different modalities. Normalization ensures that the scores for each anomaly
detector are equally weighted or combined in a way that reflects the relative
performance of each underlying model.
Second, score normalization places the scores from different subjects on the
same scale. This is only relevant for performance metrics derived from a sin-
gle global threshold, such as the global ROC curve and global EER. As the
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score distributions of different subjects vary, a single global threshold may cor-
respond to vastly different FAR and FRR for each subject. To achieve similar
FAR and FRR for each subject with a global threshold, the subject scores must
be normalized. Score normalization, in this sense, does not greatly affect the
subject EER which is based on subject-specific thresholds that vary indepen-
dently. Specifically, the min/max score normalization described in Section 6.2
results in exactly the same subject EER since the shape of the score distribution
for each subject is preserved.
Finally, score normalization can reshape the score distribution within a single
subject. This can have the effect of being robust to sample outliers and lead to a
better separation of genuine and impostor scores. Like tanh normalization [12],
the SD score normalization described in this work is robust to sample outliers,
whereas min/max score normalization is sensitive to outliers.
9. Conclusions and future work
The time between data collection sessions for each subject ranged from less
than a day to several months, with an average interval of 1 month. This captured
a wide range of variability in typing behavior. Despite this, the best system
developed in this work (system 6) remained robust over long intervals, as noted
in Morales et al. [29], having the lowest decrease in performance when testing
query samples collected 2 months after the template (5.09% EER) compared to
those collected 4 months after the template (5.10% EER). The relatively small
decrease in performance of all systems evaluated in the KBOC (the greatest
being a 7% relative increase [29]) may also be attributed to the stabilization of
subjects’ templates. Keystroke sequences have been shown to converge towards
a total profile, i.e., a stationary feature distribution, with the number of typing
repetitions [25]. First and last names are likely practiced many times by the
genuine subjects, each template having reached the subject’s total profile.
Manhattan distance is arguably the simplest anomaly detector out of the
fifteen systems evaluated in this work since it has no free parameters, yet it
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achieved the lowest EER on the test dataset of 5.32%. Since feature normal-
ization scales the features by their SD, Manhattan distance in this work is
actually similar to the scaled Manhattan distance on the raw features. Taking
the best submission (system 6) and using min/max feature normalization yields
a validation EER of 8.55 (1.21)% and test EER of 8.60%. This result is consis-
tent with Killourhy and Maxion [15], wherein scaled Manhattan obtained the
best performance. Since the publication of Killourhy and Maxion [15], other
anomaly detectors, such as Gaussian mixture models [7, 8]7, have achieved only
marginally-better performance than the scaled Manhattan distance detector.
The relative worse performance of other systems in this work over the Manhat-
tan detector indicates overfitting to the template samples, while an increase in
test EER from validation EER indicates overfitting to the development set due
to hyperparameter selection.
Unlike other keystroke biometric datasets, such as Killourhy and Maxion
[15], the input sequences (first and last name) were unique to each subject in the
KBOC dataset. Therefore, only anomaly detection approaches were investigated
in this work, as negative data could not practically be utilized for training a
discriminative model. Future work could examine the use of negative training
data when keystroke sequences are unique to each subject and highly practiced,
as is the case in the KBOC dataset.
Lastly, like most previous works, the results is this work reflect asymptotic
system performance and may be considered forensics rather than biometrics.
Both the min/max and SD score normalization methods utilize statistics of the
empirical query score distribution, which requires having observed many query
samples. Future work should investigate online score normalization, which is
subject to the order in which genuine and impostor samples appear to the
system.
7The deep neural network and other methods in Deng and Zhong [7, 8] utilize negative
data for training.
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